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Assessment of Alternative Structures for 
Privately Operated Bus Systems 
JAIMUWON 
Increasing concern for the mobility, environmental, and resource 
problems of growing or over-reliance on the automobile as a form of 
transport has created a strong desire for modern, efficient, and attractive 
public transport systems in Seoul. Practically, this generally translates 
into the efforts to build more subway lines. In Seoul, a total of 125 km 
of subway line is being constructed during the 1993-1996 period. It is 
expected that 300 km of subway system will be in place before 2000. 
This planned expansion of subway lines has placed tremendous pres-
sures on Seoul bus transport systems, particularly bus operators. The 
post-subway period 2000s can be considered as a traumatic time for 
Seoul's bus systems. Thus, it seems obvious that alternative bus indus-
try structures should be explored within the context of privately pro-
vided bus services. This article is concerned with various problems 
~nherent in bus operators and characteristics surrounding bus operation 
m Seoul. Then it examines potential alternatives for bus industry 
structures, and provides advantages and disadvantages associated with 
each alternative. 
The bus industry in Seoul is characterized by a predominance of 
small and independent private companies. As of 1992, a total of 90 
bus companies provided intra-urban bus services. No company 
operated more than 150 buses, and the average fleet size was 93 
vehicles. The service network totaled 349 routes, of which 74 were 
seat bus routes. The average round trip route length (i.e., distance 
from the base terminus or depot to the outer terminus) was 42.6 km. 
The average headway for city and seat bus was 7 min in peak period 
(Table 1). 
The Ministry of Transportation sets fares, establishes guidelines 
for determining the number of buses to be licensed on each route, 
and regulates bus design. City or provincial governments are 
responsible for route planning and the licensing of bus operations. 
The system is thus regulated by government, and the individual 
bus operators are left with little freedom to make the basic decisions 
that in most countries are regarded as their prerogative (subject usu-
ally to government approval), for instance to propose the services 
they wish to operate or the fare they will charge. Although there is 
a certain degree of flexibility in setting headways and frequencies, 
the operator is not free to decide the size of vehicle to operate or the 
color that it is painted. 
As a result, in spite of the existence of 90 companies in Seoul, 
there is very little real productive competition between them. 
Indeed, about the only element of competition is a degree of on-the-
road competition, in which routes serving the same destination but 
operated by different companies stop at the same stop and compete 
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to get there first. Despite the lack of effective competition, the cur-
rent structure provides few compensating gains in terms of coordi-
nation and integration. It would be difficult to achieve service 
improvements that would leave the existing profits of bus operators 
unchanged. Thus, in some respects, the Korean system combines 
the disadvantages of both the regulated and competitive concepts, 
with few of the benefits. 
An average route length was 41.6 km for city bus and 46.8 km 
for seat bus, respectively. The route pattern is a mixture of cross city 
services, crossing mostly the central area of Seoul. Another feature 
is considerably parallel, running along the main arterial roads in the 
corridors. Given the radial nature of the road network and the con-
sequent concentration of bus route as the central area is approached, 
it is not surprising that key passenger boarding and alighting areas 
are heavily congested. 
One of the implications of the overlap in routes and extensive 
parallel running is that there are strong competitive pressures on 
operators to run the maximum number of buses at all times, because 
the share of revenue along the main corridors between operators 
will be determined principally by the relative number ofbuses. That 
is certainly a benefit to riders because of short headways during 
peak hours. In addition, the cost structure of the industry, with its 
low variable cost element, also encourages maximum use to be 
made of each bus. In a situation in which there is little external 
control over the frequencies at which a given number of buses are 
dispatched, this may lead to intentional bunching of buses at 
specific times perceived by the operator as representing the peak of 
the peak, with consequent irregular and possibly lengthy intervals 
between buses at other times. 
It is quite common to observe the bunching of buses on major 
corridors leading to the city centers during peak hours. There is a 
long headway on routes in less populated areas. Some buses do not 
even stop at the bus stops, despite the fact that a couple of riders are 
waiting for buses. 
There may also be pressure on drivers to indulge in unsafe driving 
practices, such as racing and queue jumping. However, it appears 
that the strongest incentive for drivers to speed and drive danger-
ously comes from inadequate running times allowed in the sched-
ules, which almost certainly do not adequately reflect current traffic 
congestion levels, and delays caused by subway construction. 
POTENTIAL OBJECTIVES AND ASSESSMENT 
The potential objectives for the bus system, based on the current 
policies of government, are explored against which alternative 
industry structures can be evaluated. Of course, the total set of pos-
sible objectives is almost inevitably inconsistent-some will 
directly conflict with others. Potential objectives include 
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TABLE 1 Bus Operating Characteristics 
!Number of Number of I Headway Average Number of Operating I Operating 
Routes Buses Route Frequency per Day Time per Peak Off-peak Length(Km) I Trip(min) 
City 275 6,700 7 8 41.6 8.7 124 Bus• 
Seat 74 1,307 7 8 46.8 8.0 115 Bus .. 
= A city bus has a capacity of 80 passangers with 20 seats and 65 standees. 
== A seat bus is a seat-only bus with a capacity of 45 seats. No standee is allowed in 
seat bus. An operating speed of seat bus is much higher than city bus due to the 
limited number of stops. 
1. Provision of a comprehensive network of services to meet 
passenger demand, 
2. Reduction of central area traffic congestion, 
3. Making effective integration of the bus and subway system, 
4. Providing passengers with adequate levels of comfort and 
safety. 
5. Maintaining stability in the industry, and 
6. Keeping costs and fares at a reasonable level. 
Reviewing the current system with these objectives in mind, it is 
concluded that 
1. Bus operation is financially viable. 
2. Peak overloading continues to be a problem. 
3. The high level of bus-to-bus transfers suggests that existing 
services may not closely reflect passengers' journey patterns. 
4. There is a built-in reluctance to reduce service levels or aban-
don weak routes. 
5. High capacity buses should be considered as a means of 
relieving overcrowding and reducing street congestion. 
6. Although it is a stated objective to integrate the bus and sub-
way systems, very little has been achieved or seems likely to be 
achieved under present institutions: the restructuring of routes, the 
provision of convenient interchange facilities, and the integration of 
fare systems are not likely to occur on a significant scale. 
7. Efficient use of the network is hampered by the great com-
plexity of the present route system and the limited information on 
the system available to the public. 
8. Standards of vehicle maintenance appear high. The main 
safety problems relate to dangerous driving behavior of drivers and 
unrealistic schedules. 
9. The scope under the present system for the cross-subsidiza-
tion of services is very limited because of the small number of 
routes operated by the typical company. 
10. Current policy is to discourage the formation of new compa-
nies; this limits the possibilities of introducing new techniques and 
management methods, and removes an incentive to existing com-
panies to strive for improved performance. 
11. Although bus planning is effectively in the hands of the city 
government, the resources that it devotes to this subject are very lim-
ited in terms of numbers and professional skills. There is also very 
little monitoring of operators' compliance with license conditions. 
12. Major restructuring of the network is almost impossible with 
present institutions, as it would disturb the profitability of existing 
companies. It would be extremely difficult (a) to design a new route 
system that would leave the existing profits of individual companies 
unchanged and (b) to convince them that this would be the case so 
that they would agree to the changes. 
ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY STRUCTURES 
Assessing the current operating practices in detail, there are seven 
potential alternatives: 
1. Merger of companies into a small number of large private 
companies in each city, 
2. Merger of companies into a single private company, 
3. Merger of companies into a single public company, 
4. A single cooperative system, 
5. A district cooperative system, 
6. Revenue pooling of different operators, or 
7. A metropolitan transit authority. 
Some of these alternatives are described further in the following 
sections. 
Single (Large-Scale) Operator 
This structure has great potential benefits in terms of coordination 
and integration, which is why it is so common elsewhere. If such a 
solution were adopted in Seoul, it would be logical for the under-
takings to also own the subway systems where they exist, which 
implies some form of public ownership. 
However, the evidence reviewed in this work suggests that merger 
of all urban bus companies into one organization would not improve 
efficiency. It should be noted that merger of all Seoul's urban bus 
companies would produce one of the world's largest urban bus oper-
ators. Clearly, the problems of managing the very large bus organi-
zations that would result from such mergers would be completely 
beyond the experience of the current bus industry management. 
Therefore, in the absence of competition or a profit motivation, the 
single operator has a marked tendency to inefficiency, particularly if 
there is political intervention in day-to-day operation. 
Several Large Companies 
The creation of a small number of large bus companies in each city 
is another possibility, but this would still give rise to considerable 
problems of integration and coordination of services and fare, par-
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ticularly with the subway system. However, this alternative would 
solve some of the problems inherent in the current system. Several 
large companies could enhance the scope for cross-subsidy. This 
alternative could lead to a reduction of the number of separate 
companies with which government agencies have to deal. 
Moreover, the existence of potential competition would act as a 
spur to efficiency, although if each company were given a territor-
ial monopoly (probably necessary to achieve an adequate level of 
cross-subsidy between routes), competition would be restricted to 
the supply of services (i.e., the right to operate routes instead of 
"on-the-road"). 
If a structure of a small number of large companies is to work 
effectively, it is important that regulating agencies are able to exer-
cise the concept of replaceability: that is, it must be possible to 
replace an operator who fails to provide the required services, by 
transferring routes from one company to another. However, this 
alternative may pose a difficulty of integrating bus and subway ser-
vices if the bus companies are large and powerful. There is a gen-
eral lack of evidence that larger bus companies will be any more 
efficient than the current small companies. 
Operator Cooperative 
The cooperative system basically has two elements: a thorough 
revision of route network so as to produce a sensible and efficient 
route pattern, and a way of operating the fixing revised routes, by 
rotating them between companies, to provide an even distribution 
of costs and revenues. The basic principle is that the allocation of 
company group to route group rotates each week, so that in Week 1 
Company Group A operates Route Group 1, in Week 2 Company 
Group A operates Route Group 2, etc. The intention is thus that 
every operator has the same share of the total revenue. 
The cooperative system is a uniquely Korean institution that 
appears to work well and to be accepted by both operators and gov-
ernment as far as medium-sized cities are concerned. Its main dis-
advantage is that it involves additional dead mileage in moving 
buses and crews between the company's operating base and the 
terminus of the routes that it is operating each day. Such costs are 
estimated to add 1.5 to 2 percent to operating costs in a medium-
sized city like Daejeon. In order to avoid this drawback, it seems 
necessary to provide large-scale garages as a common basis for 
accommodating supportive facilities and maintaining operating 
vehicles for all of the participating companies. Possible advantages 
from this common garage come from the expansion of in-house 
maintenance work to include major overhauls: the development of 
a more responsive route-planning function. City governments have 
been asked by bus companies to build up such facilities between the 
company's operating bases and the terminus of the routes. 
At a more conceptual level, cooperatives also suffer from the dis-
advantage that they lack a competitive spur. In Daejeon, a cartel of 
the bus companies was formed. The cooperative has not accepted 
new members and has monopolized city transport. There is little 
incentive to innovation, particularly as far as network development 
is concerned. The fact that costs and revenues are shared equally 
also reduces the potential gains to individual companies that wish 
to promote change. In Gwangju, city government complained that 
the cooperative is not service oriented and has not done enough to 
discourage dirty buses or discourteous crew. 
Despite these disadvantages, it is generally believed that the 
cooperative principle has many significant benefits that rank it 
above the options considered so far for overcoming the disadvan-
tages of the present industry structure. It retains the small compa-
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nies to be regarded as efficient operating units, and retains the 
private ownership that provides a major incentive to keep costs 
down. It also has the advantage of being a Korean solution that has 
evolved in a Korean context. 
In the largest cities such as Seoul and Busan, a single cooperative 
would involve largely dead mileage routes; in Seoul, there are 275 
city bus routes. It is therefore impractical and inefficient for all com-
panies to rotate around all routes. 
Thus, ifthe cooperative principle were to be applied to Seoul and 
Busan and other very large cities, a number of separate coopera-
tives would have to be created-perhaps 10 to 15 in Seoul and 4 to 
5 in Busan. Ideally, each cooperative should have its own area of 
the city and a similar profitability profile, and it should be small 
enough to allow bus drivers to learn all of the routes operated. This 
should keep the increase in operating costs down to approximately 
2 to 2.25 percent. 
Revenue Pooling 
It could be argued that the moving of company buses around the 
route under the cooperative system to equalize revenue per bus is 
unnecessary and wasteful. A simpler method would be a revenue-
pooling system, whereby all of the revenues collected by individual 
companies would be deposited into a pool; this would then be 
shared between the companies on an agreed basis. 
Revenue-pooling agreements in other countries have usually 
involved a fairly small number of major operators, typically two or 
three. Where only bus companies are involved, the revenue is usually 
shared on the basis of bus kilometers operated. Sometimes, however 
(particularly if the revenue from railways as well as buses is pooled), 
the revenue is shared on the basis of the percentage of revenue accru-
ing to each company in the last year before the introduction of the 
pooling system. Either of these systems can work satisfactorily with 
a small number of operators who trust each other and in situations in 
which demand and the transport system are fairly static. 
If the situation is changing rapidly as it is in Seoul, there will be a 
frequent need for adjustments to the shares of revenue that would be 
a cause of endless argument. In addition, the cooperative system 
equalizes both revenues and costs between operators, whereas a pool-
ing system equalizes only revenues; some operators may therefore 
incur higher than average costs per kilometer or per bus because of the 
nature of their routes, and will demand a higher share of the revenue. 
The current situation of the industry in Seoul does not promote 
mutual trust between operators; indeed, there is widespread suspi-
cion that operators understate the revenue they receive so as to min-
imize tax liabilities and strengthen the case for fare increases. In 
these circumstances, the requirement of a revenue-pooling system 
in which all operators honestly report their revenues is not feasible. 
However, some changes in fare collection systems would provide a 
way of overcoming this problem. Nevertheless, the prospects for an 
immediate application of revenue-pooling systems are not good, 
and although revenue pooling in practice might evolve once coop-
eratives are firmly established, it is not an institutional option that 
can be pursued now. 
Metropolitan Transit 
Integration Authorities 
The final option considered is the formation of metropolitan transit 
integration authorities or MTIA. This concept is of an agency 
responsible for providing public transport by purchasing services 
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from operating companies. It would not operate any services itself, 
but would determine what services should be provided. 
The basic division of functions between the MTIA and operating 
companies would be that the Authority 
1. Monitors passenger demand, 
2. Plans services (routes, frequencies, capacities), 
3. Produces service specification (outline timetable), 
4. Decides fares, and 
5. Markets the services to the public. 
The operating companies 
1. Operate services, 
2. Employ operating and maintenance staff, 
3. Own assets (vehicles, depots, etc.), 
4. Produce detailed timetables, vehicle, and crew duties, and 
5. Supervise operations. 
This distribution of functions is similar to that of the transport 
communities of West Germany. 
In considering this structure, it is important to note that virtually 
all of the proposed functions of the transit integration authority-
surveying demand, planning services, regulating headways, deter-
mining bus stop locations, and setting fares-are currently per-
formed in Korea by some branch of government and not by the 
operators. The authority would simply bring these functions 
together into one body for each city. 
Although there are similarities to the German model, there are 
several important differences. First, in Korea the transit integration 
authority could not be a voluntary grouping of operators, because it 
is highly unlikely that the large number of private companies would 
all voluntarily agree to changes. Thus, the authority would have to 
be a public institution with powers granted by legislation. Where 
they are in operation or under construction, subways should also be 
under the control of the MTIA. 
A second important difference is in the area of revenue collection 
and distribution. If (as in Germany) the companies were responsi-
ble for collecting fares and handing over the revenue to the Author-
ity, it is likely that not all revenue would be handed over. There 
would also be· considerable difficulties in deciding an appropriate 
basis for revenue distribution. For these reasons, revenue collection 
would have to be entirely in the hands of the authority, ideally 
through abandoning the taking of cash on bus and the enhancement 
of the current token and ticket schemes. The authority would then 
reimburse the operators for running the services, either according to 
an agreed formula, or on the basis of prices tendered when contracts 
to run services were agreed. 
For the MTIA to function effectively, two aspects are vital. The 
first is that there is close monitoring of the performance of opera-
tors so that good operators who consistently provide the specified 
services can be distinguished from poor performers. The second is 
that there should be no unwillingness to replace operators who do 
not perform well or who are too expensive. The principal advantage 
of the MTIA concept is that it breaks the link between the prof-
itability of the individual bus operator and the routes that it oper-
ates, thereby facilitating network restructuring, bus/subway inte-
gration, and closer matching of supply to demand. 
ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES 
To evaluate alternative industry structures, the concordance analy-
sis was used (1,2). A concordance analysis is designed to select the 
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most desirable alternatives out of a series of competing alternatives. 
The selection is based on a multiplicity of criteria. Each criterion is 
provided with a preference score, so that both quantitative and qual-
itative effects can be taken into account. 
In an effort to establish effect matrix, 15 transport professionals 
and related officials were asked to provide ratings on the effects of 
alternative bus industry structures. They were requested to give a 
100 value to the most favorable alternative and 0 value to the worst 
one. To establish a degree of relative importance and to provide a test 
of consistency in the numerical weighting to follow, the same panel 
members were interviewed successively to make a series of com-
parison. The normalized effect matrix was completed as in Table 2. 
Pre-evaluation was conducted by imposing a set of constraints (in 
the form of threshold values or minimum acceptable level) as a 
basis for elimination from further consideration. Thus, 12 criteria in 
Table 2 become 7 in Table 3. 
The next step undertaken was the elimination of less favorable 
alternatives. For a given vector of importance weights W, one can 
compute the concordance and discordance indices, /Ci and /Dii, for 






- - - - JC1N ) 
/C21 ___ /C23 _____ /C2N 
IC= . 
JCNI JCN2 ______ -JCN,N-1 
(
- - /D12 /D13 - - - - - - JD 1N ) 
/D21 _ -/D23 _____ -JD2N 
ID= . 
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The /Ci and /Dii can be formally defined as the concordance index, 
for alternative O; with respect to 0 1, and the discordance index, for 
alternative O; with respect to 0 1, respectively. 
The next step was to establish the concordance dominance matrix 
F. The elements fu, i = 1, ... n; j = 1, ... n; i =F j of the concor-
dance dominance matrix Fare defined as: 
1 if /Ci> IC Ju = 0 h -:- (threshold value) ot erw1se 
Discordance matrix G is obtained in a similar manner to F. The 
elements giJ, i = 1, ... n; j = 1, ... n; i =F j are defined as: 
1 if IDii <ID 
g;i = 0 h -:- (threshold value) ot erw1se 
Note that in both F and G, a unit entry for the ith row andjth col-
umn indicates dominance of O; over Oi. 
Because the decision rule is to consider O; to outrank Oi, if both 
/Cii ~ IC and /Dii :::=; ID are true, then a joint dominance matrix E 
obtained by operation on F and G is defined. The elements e;i, 
1, ... , n;j = 1, ... n; i =F j are defined as: 
It can be observed that eu takes the value of unity only when.A= 
1 and giJ = 1, indicating that both conditions for dominance are met; 
otherwise, eu = 0. 
TABLE 2 Evaluation of Alternative Industry Structures 
"'~ I !!xi . I Several Single I Single I Single Several Revenue I Structure sting Cooper a- Pooling Hetropol_i tan ~ I Large Private I Public Cooperative ( I Trans.it 
Cr. . ~ jeo Smal~ Companies I Bus Transit (small City tive(large many . Pr. Integration 1ter1a mpan1es City only) 1vate ~ (Private) Company Company only) · ) Authority(1) 
operators 
jFacilitate matching of 0.30 0.61 0.70 0.75 o. 72 0.60 I 0.60 0.76 
!supply to demand 
Facilitate bus route 0.10 0.61 0.70 0.80 0.75 I 0.60 0.30 I 0.81 lrationali~tion/adapt-
ability to change 
I (2) Facilitate bus;subway 0.15 I 0.10 0.30 I 
0.90 I 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.91 integration 
Permit use of high 0.30 0.60 0.75 
lcapaci ty buses . I 
0.75 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.70 
I Allow cross-subsidiz- I 0.30 0.60 0.75 0.90 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.90 
ation of unprofitable 
I but socially necessary 
(3)1 I services I (3) 
Permit bus;bus 0.10 0.30 0.80 0.8.5 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.86 
transfer ticketing and 
/CYr Travelcards 
I (2) Permit bus;subway 0 a; 0 20 0 40 0 90 0 60 0 40 0 40 0 90 
through ticketing and/ 
I or Travelcards I Permit distance- 0.30 0.50 0.60 1 · 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.70 
related bus fares I I {stage/Zonal) 
!Rase of Implementation 0.50 0.45 0.10 0.40 0.42 0.60 O.iO 0.40 
I accept.ability to 
existing companies I I "workability" post- 0.75 0.62 I 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.60 I 0.30 0.20 implementation 
I 
<4> I (5) 
!Incentives to effi- 0.30 0.62 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.40 0.50 
ciency & innovation 
(6) (6) (6) (7) (7) (7.8) 




Assumes Authority works through several operator cooperatives. 





Assumes transfer ticketing.between companies or cooperatives can be arranged. 
Assumes concept of replaceability can be implemented. 
5. Assumes competitive tendering. 
6. Detrimental effect particularly in short term may not be so bad in longer 
term. 
7. Assumes cooperatives can achieve some economies e.g. in joint purchasing or 
central workshops, but these are likely to be offset by increased 'dead' 
mileage. 
8. Allows for costs of tendering and administration. 
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jo1 (Existing) 0.30 0.10 
lo2(Large Private) 0.61 0.61 
jo3(Single Public) 0.75 0.80 
04(Single Coop) 0.72 0.75 
Os(District Coop) 0.60 0.60 
j05(Authority) 0.76 0.81 
I 
Through the same rating procedure as earlier, the weight vector 
for the reduced set of criteria was generated as follows: 
C1: Service provision 
C2 : Route change 
C3: Transfer 
C4 : High capacity 
C5: Workability 










Based on the weighted normalized alternative matrix, the 
following concordance matrix (IC) and discordance matrix (ID) 
were constructed. 
0.41 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
0.59 0.79 0.61 0.59 0.54 
IC= 0.39 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.61 
0.39 0.40 0.87 0.59 0.54 
0.39 0.42 0.87 0.42 0.54 
0.39 0.47 0.40 0.47 0.47 
0.26 1.00 0.27 0.18 1.00 
1.00 0.74 0.22 0.33 0.76 
ID= 1.00 0.99 0.70 0.67 0.91 
0.92 0.28 0.96 0.26 0.73 
0.70 0.42 0.98 0.15 0.87 
1.00 1.00 0.32 0.72 0.58 
Having completed IC and ID matrices, it is necessary to decide on 
threshold values. Average index (0.58) was applied in this case. The 
resulting concordance matrix F and discordance matrix G are then: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
F= 1 0 G = 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
By confirming F and G, Eis obtained. 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
E= 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
C3 C4 Cs ~ C7 l I 
0.15 0.30 0.75 0.30 0.52 
0.10 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.40 
0.80 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.05 
0.30 0.50 0.60 0.55 0.50 
0.40 0.45 0.68 0.52 0.51 
0.81 0.70 0.20 0.50 0.20 
The two undominated alternatives turned out to be Alternatives 4 
(single cooperative) and 5 (district cooperative). However, Alterna-
tive 5 generally received higher values on important criteria 
than Alternative 4. Thus, Alternative 5 was chosen as the best alter-
native. This outcome is generally consistent with a prior expectation, 
as the district cooperative has great potential benefits for a large city 
like Seoul in terms ofrevenue redistribution and route rationalization. 
The other reason for this outcome appears to be that district coopera-
tive would not require much of the municipal expenditures. Although 
the criterion "bus and subway integration" appears rather low, the 
remaining criteria are more than enough to offset this criterion. 
CONCLUSION 
This research reveals that the idea of substantial mergers of bus com-
panies and public ownership should be rejected. The existing com-
panies are efficient profit-oriented units, even though some suffer 
from financial difficulties. However, the role that the bus industry is 
asked to fulfill is changing rapidly, and its weakness is in its slow 
adaptability under the conditions of changing passenger demands. 
The major issue is therefore how to devise an industry structure that 
preserves the best features of the current institutions while allowing 
for a greater level of flexibility to meet the needs of passengers. 
One of the most important features of the current system is the 
reliance on small private companies to provide services. As suppli-
ers of services, they appear to function well. However, from the 
point of view of the requirements for a network of services, the mul-
tiplicity of companies is counterproductive. Therefore, there is a 
strong need for much improved coordination among bus companies. 
This can be achieved by the formation of operator cooperative along 
the lines already followed in Daejeon and Gwangju cities. 
The most feasible alternative turned out to be the district cooper-
ative. The largest city, Seoul, is too large for a single cooperative 
and has the added dimension of subway systems. Therefore, the 
companies should be grouped into a number of cooperatives of 
between 500 and 700 buses on a district basis. This alternative 
leaves the basic supply side of the industry unchanged, but it opens 
up many possibilities for making better use of the supply of bus ser-
vices through network restructuring and revenue redistribution. 
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